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Model Sentencing Guidelines §2B1 Theft,
Embezzlement, Receipt of Stolen Property, Property
Destruction, and Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit
(a) Base Offense Level: The base offense level for all
offenses covered by this guideline is i.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(i) Loss: If the loss exceeded $io,ooo, increase the
offense level as follows:
(A) More than $io,ooo
add i
(B) More than $5o,ooo

add 2

(C) More than $200,000
add 3
(D) More than $i million
add 4
(E) More than $20 million
add 5
(F) More than $ioo million
add 6
(2) Other financial harms: If the offense involved one or
more of the following indicators of special financial
harmfulness, increase the offense level by one level:
(A) The offense substantially jeopardized the
safety and soundness of a financial institution;
(B) The offense substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of an organization
that, at any time during the offense, (a) was a
publicly traded company, or (b) had i,ooo or
more employees.
(3) Victims: If the offense involved twenty-five or more
victims, increase the offense level by one level.
(4) Particularly blameworthy offenses or conduct: If
the offense involved one or more of the following
circumstances, increase the offense level by
one level:
(A) The offense involved receiving stolen property,
and the defendant was in the business of
receiving and selling stolen property;
(B) The defendant was, at the time of the offense,
an officer or director of a publicly traded company which was a victim of the offense;
(C) The offense of conviction was a criminal violation of securities law and, at the time of the
offense, the defendant was a registered broker
or dealer, or an investment adviser;
(D) The offense of conviction was a criminal violation of commodities law and, at the time of the
offense, the defendant was an officer or direc-

tor of a futures commission merchant or an
introducing broker, a commodities trading
advisor, or a commodity pool operator;
(E) The offense involved a violation of a prior specific judicial or administrative order,
injunction, or decree;
(F) The defendant was convicted of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. S T030(a)(5)(A)(i);

(G) The defendant was convicted of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. S103o, and the offense caused a
substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.
(c) Mandatory factors to be considered in setting sentence
within applicable range
If the offense involved one or more of the following circumstances, the court [shall/should ordinarily]
impose a sentence above the midpoint of the applicable
sentencing range:
(i) Other financial harms: The offense substantially
endangered the solvency or financial security of
ten or more persons;
(2) Planning activity: The offense involved "sophisticated means."
(d) Advisory factors to be considered in setting sentence
within applicable range
(I) Aggravating factors: In determining the sentence
within the applicable sentencing range, the court
should consider whether any of the following
aggravating factors exist:
(A) The offense involved theft from a person;
(B) The offense involved multiple victims;
(C) The offense substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of fewer than ten
persons, or of a business entity smaller than
that described in section (b)(2) (B);
(D) The offense involved misappropriation of a
trade secret and the defendant knew or
intended that the offense would benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or
foreign agent;
(E) The offense involved a misrepresentation
that the defendant was acting on behalf of a
charitable, educational, religious, or government agency;
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(F) The offense involved a misrepresentation or
other fraudulent action in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding;
(G) A primary objective of the offense was an
aggravating, non-monetary objective, as for
example, if a primary objective of the offense
was to inflict emotional harm;
(H) The offense created a risk of substantial loss
beyond the loss determined for purposes of
setting the offense level; or
(I) In a case involving access devices or unlawfully
produced or unlawfully obtained means of
identification:
(i) The offense caused substantial harm to
the victim's reputation or credit record, or
the victim suffered a substantial inconvenience related to repairing the victim's
reputation or a damaged credit record;
(ii) An individual whose means of identification the defendant used to obtain
unlawful means of identification is erroneously arrested or denied a job because
an arrest record has been made in that
individual's name.
(iii) The defendant produced or obtained
numerous means of identification with
respect to one individual and essentially
assumed that individual's identity.
(2) Mitigating factors: In determining whether a sentence within the applicable sentencing range, the
court should consider whether any of the following
mitigating factors exist:
(A) In a case in which both actual and intended
loss are found to have occurred, the intended
loss was substantially in excess of the
actual loss.
(B) In a case in which actual loss is found to have
occurred, the gain the defendant personally
received or expected to receive was zero or very
small in comparison to the actual loss.
(e) Downward departures
In cases in which the offense level determined
under this guideline substantially overstates the seriousness of the offense, a downward departure below
the bottom of the otherwise applicable sentencing
range may be warranted.
Application Notes:
i. Definitions. Forpurposes of this guideline:
"Financialinstitution" includes any institution
described in 18 U.S.C. ff20, ff
656, ff657, ff 1005, ff1oo6,f
1007, orff 1014; any state orforeign bank, trust company,

credit union, insurancecompany, investment company,
mutualfund, savings (buildingand loan) association,
union or employee pensionfund; any health, medical, or
hospital insuranceassociation;brokers and dealers registered, or requiredto be registered,with the Securities and

Exchange Commission;futures commodity merchants and
commodity pool operators registered, or requiredto be registered, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
and any similarentity, whether or not insured by the frderal government. "Union or employee pensionfund" and
"any health, medical, or hospital insurance association,"
primarily include large pensionfunds that serve many persons (e.g., pensionfunds of large national and
internationalorganizations,unions, and corporations
doing substantial interstatebusiness), and associations
that undertake to provide pension, disability, or other benefits (e.g., medical or hospitalization insurance) to large
numbers of persons.
"Foreigninstrumentality"and 'foreign agent" have the
meanings given those terms in 18 U.S.C. ff1839(1) and
(2), respectively.
"Mass marketing" means a plan,program,promotion,
or campaign that is conducted through solicitationby telephone, mail, the internet or other means to induce a large
number of persons to purchase goods or services,participate
in a contest or sweepstakes, or investforfinancialprofit.
"Publicly traded company" means an issuer (A) with a
class of securitiesregistered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ff781); or (B) that is
required tofile reports under section 15 (d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ff780(d)). "Issuer" has
the meaninggiven that term in section 3 of the (15 U.S.C.
ff
78c).
"Sophisticatedmeans" means especially complex or
especially intricateconduct pertainingto the execution or
concealment of an offense. Conduct such as hiding assets or
transactions,or both, through the use offictitious entities,
corporate shells, or offihore financial accounts ordinarily
indicatessophisticated means. The use of mass marketing
establishes the existence of sophisticated means.
"Theft from the person of another" means theft, without
the use offorce, of property that was being held by another
person or was within arms reach. Examples include pickpocketing and nonforcible purse-snatching,such as the theft
of a pursefrom a shopping cart.
"Trade secret" has the meaning given that term in 18
U.S.C.ff 1839(3).
"Victim" means any person who sustained any part of
the actual loss determined under subsection (b) (i), or any
person that the defendant intended should sustain a loss.
"Person"includes individuals, corporations,companies,
associations,firms, partnerships,societies, andjoint stock
companies.
2.

"Loss'.

A. Subject to the exclusions in subsection E below, loss is
the greaterof actual loss or intended loss.
i. "Actual loss" means the reasonablyforeseeable
pecuniary harm that resultedfrom the offense.
ii. "Intended loss" means the pecuniary harm that
was intended to resultfrom the offense, and
includes intended pecuniary harm that would
have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as
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in a governmental sting operation, or an insurancefraud in which the claim exceeded the
insured value).
iii. "Pecuniaryharm" means harm that is monetary
or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.
Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include
emotionaldistress, harm to reputation,or other
non-economic harm.
iv. "Reasonablyforeseeablepecuniary harm" means
pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under
the circumstances, reasonably should have known,
was a potential result of the offense.
B. Determinationof loss for purposes of determining
offense level-The finder offact need not determine the
amount of loss with precision. However, any increase
in the defendant's offense level based on loss amount
pursuantto Section 2B1 (b) (i) must be supported by
an admission by the defendant or afindingbeyond a
reasonabledoubt pursuantto the provisionsof Model
Sentencing Guidelines1f1.3 that the loss was greater
than the amount necessary to triggera particular
offense level increase. For example, in a jury trial, an
increase of three offense levels pursuant to Section
2B1 (b)
(1) (C)could only be imposed based on afinding by thejury beyond a reasonabledoubt that the loss
was more than $200,000.
C. Estimate of loss for purposes of determininga sentence
within range-In order to determine an appropriate
sentence within the applicableguideline range, the sentencing court will ordinarilyfind it necessary to have a
more precise estimate of loss than the finding that the
amount of the loss is greaterthan the amount necessary to trigger a particularoffense level increase
pursuantto Section 2Bi (b) (1). For example, iftwo
defendants in different cases were both found to have
inflicted losses greater than $200,000, thus qualifying
both for a three-offense-level increasefor loss pursuant
to Section 2B1 (b)(i)
(C), but one of the defendants
caused a loss of $201,000, while the other caused a loss
of $999,ooo, the differing loss amounts would, all else
being equal,justify the imposition of a higher sentence
within the applicable range on the second defendant
than on the first. In order to obtain a more precise estimate of loss than that necessary to apply the offense
level increases in Section 2B1(b) (1),
a court sitting in a
jury trial may, with the consent of the parties,ask the
jury to return a special verdict containingsuch an estimate based on a preponderanceof the evidence.
Alternatively, ifrequested by at least one of the parties,
the court should make such an estimate itselfas part of
the sentencing process,as it would any other aggravatingfactor relevant to determination of a sentence
within the applicable range,pursuant to the provisions
of Model Sentencing Guidelinesffl. 5.
D. Gain-Thefinder offact may use the gain that
resultedfrom the offense as an alternativemeasure of
loss, but only ifitfinds, pursuant to the provisions of
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Model Sentencing Guidelinesff1.3 (if the finder offact
is a jury or ajudge presiding in a bench trial) orff.5
(if thefinder offact is ajudge decidingfacts relevant to
determinationof the sentence within the applicable
guideline range), that there was a loss, but that the
amount of that loss cannot reasonably be determined.
E. Exclusions from loss-Loss shall not include the following:
(i) Interest of any kind,finance charges, latefres,
penalties, amounts based upon an agreed-upon
return or rate of return, or other similarcosts.
(ii) Costs to the government of and costs incurred by
victims primarily to aid the government in, the
prosecution and criminal investigationof an
offense.
F. Credits againstloss-In determining the amount of
lossfor purposes of adjusting the offense level pursuant
to Section 2B1 (b) (1), andfor purposes of determining
the defendant's sentence within the applicablerange,
the amount of loss shall be reduced by the following:
(i) The money returned, and the fair market value of
the property returned and the services rendered,by
the defendant or otherpersons actingjointly with
the defrndant, to the victim before the offense was
detected. The time of detection of the offense is the
earlierof(I) the time the offense was discovered by
a victim or government agency; or (II) the time
the defendant knew that the offense was detected or
about to be detected by a victim or government
agency.
(ii) In a case involving collateralpledged or otherwise
provided by the defendant, the amount the victim
has recovered at the time of sentencingfrom disposition of the collateral,or ifthe collateral has not
been disposed of by that time, the fair market value
of the collateral at the time of sentencing.
G. [DRAFTER'S NOTE: THE FOREGOING SECTIONS INCL UDE MOST OF THE IMPORTANT
RULES ON THE DEFINITION OF LOSS. SOME
OF THE MORE PARTICULAR RULES RELATING TO SPECIAL CASES OR CIRCUMSTANCES
WOULD DOUBTLESS ALSO BE INCLUDED IN
A FINAL VERSION OF THIS GUIDELINE.]
3. Multiple-count indictments
Some fraudulentschemes may result in multiple-count
indictments, depending on the technical elements of the
offense. In determiningthe loss for purposes of applying the
offense level increases of Section 2B1 (b) (1), the cumulative
loss caused or intended to be caused by a common scheme
or course ofconduct should be used in determiningthe
offense level, regardless of the number of counts of conviction. However, an actual or intended loss may only be
counted if it was intended by the defendant to resultfrom,
or was the reasonablyforeseeable result of a scheme or
course ofconduct alleged in at least one of the counts of conviction. In determiningthe lossfor purposes of setting a
defendant's sentence within the applicableguideline range,
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4.

5.

6.

7.

the court may consider, in addition,such other loss, if any,
that should properly be considered by applicationof Model
Sentencing Guidelinesfi.6 (Determinationof Aggravating
Factors Relevant to Sentence Within Range).
Enhancements for 2 5 or more victims and endangering
financial institutions and other large business entities, double counting
A case of sufficient magnitude to endanger the safety or
soundness of a financial institution, or the solvency or
financialsecurity of a publicly traded company or a corporation with more than i,ooo employees, is highly likely to
involve more than 25 victims. Accordingly, in order to avoid
over-punishmentfor closely correlatedfactors, if one of the
enhancements in Model Sentencing Guidelinesff2Bi (b ) (2)
is applied, do not apply the enhancementfor more than 25
victims of Model Sentencing Guidelinesff2B1 (b) (3).
Enhancementsfor officer or directorof publicly tradedcorporation and role in the offense, double counting
A defendant who receives an enhancement pursuantto
Model Sentencing GuidelinesfJ'2B1 (b) (4) (B) as "an officer
or directorof a publicly traded company which was a victim of the offense" is also highly likely to be "an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity that
involvedfive or more participants"and thus to be eligible
for an enhancement under Model Sentencing Guidelines
3.1 (a) (1). In order to avoid over-punishmentfor closely correlatedfactors, only one of these enhancements may be
applied to a single defendant.
Limitation on sophisticatedmeans aggravatorin
high-loss cases
A defendant convicted of an economic offense that
caused or was intended to cause a loss of more than $1 million is highly likely to employ sophisticated means to
accomplish this end. Accordingly, in order to avoid overpunishmentfor closely correlatedfactors, the sentencing
judge should not rely on Model Sentencing Guidelines
2B1 (c)(2) tojustify a sentence above the midpoint of the
applicablerange in any case involving an actual or
intended loss in excess of $1million.
[DRAFTER'S NOTE: THE FOREGOING SECTIONS
INCLUDE MOST OF THE IMPORTANT RULES ON
THE APPLICATION OF THIS ECONOMIC CRIME
G UIDELINE. SOME OTHER MORE PARTICULAR
RULES RELATING TO SPECIAL CASES OR CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DOUBTLESS ALSO BE
INCLUDED IN A FINAL VERSION OF THIS GUIDELINE.]

Drafter's Commentary
General Observations
I have a particular personal interest in the configuration of
the federal sentencing guidelines governing economic
offenses. I spent some five years working (with many others) toward the reconfiguration of the old, formerly
separate, theft and fraud guidelines into the current consolidated economic crime guideline, U.S.S.G. S2BI.i. I And

shortly after that process was completed in 2001, I became
enmeshed in the debate over the sentencing components
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2 and the ensuing round
of guidelines amendments.2 I have taken several general
lessons from this long experience.
First, the large number and differing types of economic crimes embraced by federal statutes make drafting
generally applicable sentencing rules for these offenses
extraordinarily challenging.3
Second, the Sentencing Commission has done a commendable job of identifying factors that ought to be
considered in sentencing an economic offender. It is hard
to deny that the amount of loss inflicted by an economic
offense,4 the complexity of the scheme devised by the
defendant,5 the number of affected victims, 6 the size of
the defendant's personal gain, 7 damage to financial institutions or large corporations,8 the position of defendants
within victim entities, 9 and most of the other factors now
embodied in Section 2BLi are relevant to offense seriousness and thus to punishment.
Third, nonetheless, the current guidelines do a poor
job of quantifying the sentencing effects of all these factors. The present economic crime guideline, U.S.S.G.
2BI.I, embodies two basic errors. The first is the assignment of independent weight to a large number of factors
that in practice are closely correlated. For example, the
current guidelines impose offense level increases for a
large number of victims, a sophisticated scheme, derivation of a large personal gain, and high corporate position.
All of these factors are closely correlated in the sense that
a substantial corporate fraud is very likely to involve all of
them. Yet each of these factors generates a separate
offense level increase. More importantly, each of these
factors is also closely correlated with a high loss amount,
which imposes a separate and very substantial offense
level increase of its own. In effect, what the Guidelines
have done over time is to tease out many of the factors for
which loss was already a rough proxy and give them independent weight in the offense level calculus. This first
error has been compounded by a second, the failure to
remember the logarithmic structure of the Guidelines'
sentencing table. Because the sentencing table was constructed according to constraints imposed by the so-called
"25 percent rule,"I" the size of the sentence increase associated with each one-offense-level movement up the table
increases steadily the further one travels up the vertical
offense level axis. Thus, a one-offense-level increase at
the bottom of the table changes a defendant's sentencing
range not at all," while the same one-offense-level
increase at the top of the sentencing table increases the
defendant's minimum sentence by three years and his
maximum sentence from thirty years to life imprisonment.1 2 The result is that factors for which loss is already
a proxy not only have been given independent weight but
also can impose dramatic increases in prison time
because they add offense levels on top of those already
imposed for loss itself.
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Fourth, the trend toward over-quantification of dosely
correlated factors was already pronounced at the time of
the promulgation of the 2001 Economic Crime Package
consolidating and amending the theft and fraud guidelines,
but the political storm unleashed by the corporate scandals
of 2001-2002 produced guideline amendments that dictate frankly absurd sentences for defendants in large fraud
cases. For example, had Kenneth Lay lived to face sentencing in the Enron case, and if the current guidelines were
applied to his case, his offense level could easily have been
as high as 55-which translates to the mandatory life
imprisonment called for by an offense level of 43, plus
twelve additional levels.3 No other class of federal crime
produces offense levels this high. An armed bank robber
who discharged a firearm, caused permanent injury to a
victim, kidnapped a hostage, and got away with $io million
would receive, at most, an offense level of 44.14 Even a terrorist or serial killer who committed fifty premeditated
first-degree murders could score no higher than an offense
level 48.5 Moreover, the average sentences actually imposed
for robbery and murder in federal courts are still further
removed from the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines
for white-collar crime. In 2005, the average sentence actually imposed on robbers with no prior criminal record was
only fifty-seven months, or less than five years., 6 Even robbers who were also Criminal History Category VI career
offenders only received an average of i68 months, or fourteen years. 7 The average sentence for all murderers
regardless of prior criminal record is less than nineteen
years.' 8 And in 2005 the mean sentence for murderers who
were also career offenders was twenty-five years,' 9
markedly less than the life imprisonment plus twelve levels
suggested by the Guidelines for first-time fraud defendants
in the circumstances of Mr. Lay.
Even assuming that any form of stealing, on no matter
how grand a scale, merits life imprisonment, the fact that
the guidelines contemplate life imprisonment-and then
a bunch more-for such crimes reveals the degree to
which emotion has overtaken logic in this area. After all,
once you have sentenced a man to a federal term of life
imprisonment, which really is imprisonment for one's
natural life, there is nothing left to do to him, save perhaps
spitting on his grave. And the overkill of the current economic crime guidelines is not limited to the most culpable
offenders in the most exceptional cases. The over-quantification of closely correlated factors is so extreme that a
corporate officer, stockbroker, or commodities trader
engaged in a stock fraud causing a loss as low as $2.5 million could be subject to a guidelines sentence of life
20
imprisonment.
I do not wish to be misunderstood here. Prior to the
advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, sentences for
serious economic crimes were far too low. The Guidelines
did a service by ensuring that far more white-collar and
other economic offenders saw the inside of a prison cell.
Moreover, in my own view (which is not necessarily shared
by other members of the working group for this project), the
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general trend during the guidelines period toward increasing the severity of economic crime sentences has, until
recently, been a desirable one. To mention only the most
obvious points: (i) thievery and fraud are serious crimes,
particularly when the financial harm is great, and deserve
punishment on par with other serious offenses; and (2) economic offenders, particularly white-collar criminals, are
usually seen as more apt than other defendants to be
rational calculators of risk and reward, and thus the real
prospect of serious prison time should act as a meaningful
deterrent. That said, the combination of political pressure
and some failures of foresight on the part of those involved
in revising the economic crimes guidelines in recent years
(including myself) has produced Guidelines sentencing
ranges for moderate-to-serious white-collar offenders that
simply cannot be rationally defended. It is one thing to say
that those who steal tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars should do at least some prison time, or even that those
who steal millions of dollars should serve long sentences. It
is quite another to write rules that purport to make whitecollar crime the most severely punished class of noncapital
offenses known to federal law."1 Moreover, one should perhaps be cautious in absolutely requiring very long sentences
for high-loss economic crime cases when, in many
instances, the line between a criminal violation and highrisk, entrepreneurial, but legal, behavior can be fairly thin.
As a consequence, one objective of this reconceived
economic crime guideline has been to maintain rough
outcome neutrality in comparison to the current Guidelines for defendants involved in cases of low to moderate
seriousness, while restoring some rationality to sentences
at the higher end of the spectrum. This end is achieved
largely by reemphasizing a central insight of the original
fraud and theft guidelines, namely that loss is a good
proxy for many, perhaps most, of the recognized indicators of offense seriousness in economic offenses. Hence,
loss should be the primary determinant of sentencing
range. Those factors for which loss serves as a rough

proxy, many of which have been teased out and given
independent significance over the years, are largely
treated as factors to be considered by the court when setting a sentence within the applicable guidelines range.
Where they are retained as factors relevant to setting
offense level, either in this guideline or in the generally
applicable factors enumerated in Chapter 3 of these
model guidelines, the application notes limit their effect
by precluding separate offense level enhancements for
obviously correlated factors such as "more than 25 victims" and endangering the financial well-being of large
organizations (Application Note 4), or for being an officer
or director of a publicly traded company and role in the
offense (Application Note 5).
The Loss Table
The loss table proposed here reduces the number of decision points for loss from the current sixteen down to six.
Practically speaking, because the number of cases involv-
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ing losses in excess of $20 million is probably fewer than
a dozen each year,2 2 the number of commonly used decision points is reduced to four-more than $io,ooo; more
than $5o,ooo; more than $2oo,ooo; and more than $i

million. Ever since Blakely raised the specter of putting all
guidelines factors to juries, a commonly voiced concern of
judges and lawyers charged with litigating fraud cases has
been the difficulty of asking juries to make precise determinations of loss amount. The marked simplification of
the loss table proposed here should ameliorate, if not completely eliminate, the practical difficulties associated with
proving loss at trial. All that would be necessary to meet
the constitutional standard of Blakely and Booker is that
the government allege and the jury find a loss in excess of
one of the cutoff points. Should either party wish to establish a more precise loss figure for purposes of arguing that
loss amount justifies a particular sentence within the
applicable range, Application Note 2C suggests several
methods of establishing such a figure. The Application
Note proposes that a court could, with the consent of the
parties, submit a special interrogatory to the jury asking
that it make a more specific determination of loss. Alternatively, the Note proposes that, upon request of at least
one of the parties, the court should employ the procedures
of Model Sentencing Guidelines 51.5 to make a more precise loss determination in the same way it would
determine any other aggravating factor relevant to imposition of a sentence within the applicable guideline range.
Non-loss Factors That Affect Offense Level
In the proposed guideline, all non-loss factors that affect
offense level are lumped into three groups: other financial
harms, 21BI(b)(2); victims, S2Bi(b)( 3 ); and particularly
blameworthy offenses or conduct, 52BrI(b)( 4 ). A defendant
can receive only one upward sentence range bump per
group, even if the government were to charge and prove
more than one factor listed in a particular group. Therefore, other than loss, there could only be three additional
upward adjustments of sentencing range in any given
case. Given the stringency of the requirements of subsection (b)(a), "Other Financial Harms," the maximum

number of available upward adjustments in all but the
most extraordinary case would be two.
The foregoing point has a corollary regarding simplicity
of proof at trial. Notice that most of the specific offense
characteristics (SOCs) in section (b)(4 ) are either established
simply by virtue of the identity of the offense of conviction
or would be part and parcel of the proof of the government's
case regardless of the existence of these sentencing provisions. Because factors in (b)(3 ) arise so rarely, as a practical
matter, the government would be taxed in any given case
with proving only loss and one other sentence-enhancing
factor in addition to the statutory elements of the crime.
Mandatory Factors in Setting Sentence within Range
The first draft of this guideline identified four groups of
non-loss factors to be determined by the jury.

FEDERAL

First, traditionally, the two primary means of determining offense seriousness in economic crime cases have
been the size of the crime in economic terms (the loss)
and indicators of special, complex planning activity.
Because, unlike many crimes against persons, economic
crimes are not distinguished by different culpable mental
states written into the elements of the offense, evidence of
complex planning activity has been deemed to show a
more blameworthy culpable mental state. In addition,
complex planning activity suggests a higher degree of
social dangerousness on the part of the offender. Accordingly, the first draft of this guideline culled from the
current guidelines those factors that suggested complex
planning (number of victims and use of "sophisticated
means") and put them in a group.
Second, in more recent times, efforts have been made to
account for harm to victims other than their simple dollarsand-cents losses. We have recognized that one who steals a
large amount from one who can afford it may be committing a less serious offense than stealing a smaller amount
from a victim for whom the loss is financially debilitating.
Likewise, one who commits a crime that brings down a
business organization causes harm to all those who depend
on that business for employment, retirement benefits, sales
for their own companies, and the like. The first draft of this
guideline culled factors of this sort from the current guidelines and put them in another group.
Third, although physical injuries rarely occur in theft
and fraud crimes, they occasionally do happen and the
current guidelines have provisions for that eventuality.
The first draft of this guideline included a separate group
of specific offense characteristics dealing with such cases.
Fourth, over time, Congress and the Commission have
identified certain types of economic crime as being more
serious than garden-variety thefts and frauds. These were
grouped together in what was section (b)(5 ) of the original
draft.
The present draft of the economic crime guideline
embodies several important changes to the original structure.
First, feedback from the working group suggested that
references to physical harm or the risk thereof should be
removed from the economic crime guideline to be
addressed when necessary by the general provision in
Model Sentencing Guidelines S3-3.
Second, I continue to think that both complex planning
activity and assessment of the degree of financial harm
caused beyond dollar loss amount are important considerations in setting a sentence. Moreover, I lean to the view that
these considerations ought to play a mandatory role in setting a sentence. However, the factual determinations
involved in assessing these factors are difficult in a jury
trial setting. For example, determining whether a particular
crime involved "sophisticated means" requires a comparative judgment weighing the facts of the present crime
against other "typical" crimes. This is a task which is relatively simple for a judge, but for which juries are poorly
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equipped. Likewise, determining the effect of a crime on
the solvency and financial prospects of a number of victims
would be a lengthy, resource-intensive process before a
jury but could be addressed more expeditiously before a
judge. Accordingly, sophisticated means and individual victim solvency were removed from among the factors that
would be decided by a jury and would determine sentencing range, and are instead to be facts a judge must find. If
found, these facts would not change the defendant's sentencing range. Rather, a finding of one or the other (or
both) of these facts would create either a requirement or a
form of presumption that the judge impose a sentence
above the midpoint of the otherwise applicable range.
Whether the finding would impose a requirement or presumption would depend on the form of words chosen from
the bracketed language in Section 2B1i(c). If the word
"shall" was selected, a sentence above the midpoint would
be required, or to put it more precisely, the midpoint of the
range would become, in effect, the new bottom of the applicable range. If the phrase "should ordinarily" was selected,
the effect would be to create a presumption of a sentence
above the midpoint of the range.
The members of the defense bar affiliated with the
working group are unanimous in disapproving of the midpoint mechanism, in either its mandatory or presumptive
form. The pros and cons of the idea are discussed in the
Editor's Observations at the beginning of this Issue. 3 If it
were decided that the victim solvency and sophisticated
means provisions of Section 2B1i(c) were undesirable,
these factors could readily be added to the list in Section
2Bi(d)(i) of aggravating factors relevant to determination
of sentence within range.
Advisory Factors in Setting Sentence within Range
The list of aggravating factors relevant to determination of
sentence within range, Model Sentencing Guidelines
S2B1i(d)(i), is composed of factors for which loss is already
a rough proxy (such as the existence of multiple victims
and endangerment of the financial security of fewer than
ten victims), nonmonetary harms (such as the existence of
a noneconomic criminal objective), and particular kinds of
economic crime that Congress has in the past suggested
should be sentenced more stringently (such as bankruptcy
fraud and access device fraud). These factors were categorized as advisory factors to be considered in sentencing
within range rather than as factors setting offense level
either because, though relevant, they are already partially
accounted for through loss amount or some generally
applicable factor such as role in the offense, or because
they lack sufficient independent significance to merit a
full offense level adjustment.
Comparison of Outcomes under Current and
Model Guidelines
Critical to assessing any proposed revision of the current
federal sentencing guidelines is a comparison of the outcomes that would be produced under the revised system
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as compared to the system now in place. Several years ago,
in the course of analyzing the evolution of the federal economic crimes guidelines, I prepared a set of hypothetical
cases demonstrating the persistent (and in recent years
dramatic) increases in the sentencing range prescribed by
successive versions of the Guidelines from 1987 through
the adoption of the 2003 post-Sarbanes-Oxley guidelines
amendments.24 A slightly modified version of that comparison is contained in Figures A and B below. Figure C
applies this model economic crimes guideline to the same
hypothetical cases. Figures A, B, and C are largely selfexplanatory; however, a few points should be highlighted.
First, as noted above, the model guideline proposed here
is roughly outcome- neutral for cases of low-to-moderate
seriousness. Among Defendants A through G, the old and
new ranges for Defendants A, B, D, E, and F overlap either
completely or predominantly. The sentencing range for
Defendant C, the postal worker who steals credit cards from
the mail, would be reduced from 30-37 months under the
current guidelines to 12-24 months under the model,
largely due to the omission in the model of the current large
offense level increase for theft of undelivered mail.5 Defendant G, the computer expert who steals personal data online
to obtain $450,000 in merchandise and phony car loans,
would have a sentencing range of 87-io8 months under the
current guidelines and a range of 6o-96 months under the
model guidelines. This result is readily justifiable on the
ground that the offense level of 29 under the current guidelines results from application of several enhancements so
closely correlated as to verge on double counting of the
same factor-an increase of 14 levels for loss greater than
$400,ooo, a 2-level sophisticated means enhancement, a 2level enhancement for use of a special skill, and a 2-level
enhancement for more than ten victims. In the aggregate,
these separate factors do little more than describe aspects of
a moderately large complex fraud.
Second, again as noted above, the model guidelines
prescribe sentences for the most serious white-collar
offenders that are very high by historical standards but
somewhat less severe than those called for under current
guidelines. While some may note that adoption of this
model guideline would effectively return guidelines sentences for high-loss white-collar fraud offenders to
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley levels, any fair-minded observer
would have to agree both that current high-end white-collar guidelines sentences are irrational and that the
sentences called for by the model are quite tough. Moreover, the sentencing ranges in the model are consistent
with the sentences actually being imposed in cases of this
sort. For example, Defendant J is patterned on the lead
defendants in the round of corporate fraud cases that
began with the Enron bankruptcy. The model guideline
prescribes a sentence of 20-25 years for such a defendant,
a prescription consistent with the 25-year sentence
imposed after trial on Bernie Ebbers, president and CEO
of WorldCom, and the is-year sentence imposed on John
Rigas, chairman and CEO of Adelphia Communications.2
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Figure A: Description of Representative Defendants
Def. A
Def. B
Def. C
Def. D
Def. E
Def. F
Def. G

Def. H

Def. I

Def. J

Teller in federally insured bank. Steals $2,000 from teller drawer.
Wife of social security recipient. Continues to cash checks after death of spouse. Loss = $n,ooo.
Defendant is a postal worker who steals credit cards from the mail and uses them to purchase goods worth $35,000,
which he then sells to support a drug habit.
Defendant commits online auction fraud from his home computer. Causes loss of $55,000 to more than fifty victims.
Doctor submits false billings to Medicare using complex system of double books. Loss = $125,000.
Telemarketer runs boiler room with eight employees. Defrauds more than 25o elderly victims of $250,000.
Computer expert constructs scheme for stealing credit card and other personal information online. Using this information, he obtains merchandise and phony car loans online totaling $450,000 from twenty-five individual and
institutional victims.
President of small, publicly traded bank commits bank fraud causing loss of $i.i million and collapse of the bank.
In the course of the offense, he causes false statements to be made in required SEC filings. Thirty employees lose
their jobs.
CEO of publicly traded corporation operating chain of hospitals and nursing homes, in collusion with four other
members of his management team, defrauds Medicaid and Medicare of $io.i million and causes false statements to
be made in required SEC filings.
CEO of large conglomerate, in collusion with CFO and other members of management, engage in accounting fraud
and stock manipulation causing bankruptcy of company and losses to shareholders and employee pension fund of
$410 million.

Figure B: Guideline Range of Representative Defendants under Existing Guidelines
(shaded boxes indicate sentence increase due to guidelines change)
1989

1987
Def. A
Def. B
Def. C
Def. D
Def. E
Def. F
Def. G

Def. H
Def. I
Def. J

o-6 mos.

o-6 mos.18
2-8 mos.

30
34

15-21 mOS.
12-18

35

9

mos,3

4

24-30 mos. 3
47

6

4-51 mos.
30-37 ins

37-46

6
57-71 mos. 4

1998

o-6 mos.

o-6 mos.
4-10 mos.
15-21 mos.
12-18 mos.
24-30 mos.
-6]

15-21 mos.

12-18 mos.
24-30 mos.
41-51 mos.
30-37 mos.

6

mos.5
6
87-io8 mos. ,
6
121-151 mos.

27-33 mos.55
6o
57-71 mos.

i991
4-10 mos.

4-10 mos.3

12-18 mos.
lO-16 mos.3S
4
21-27 mos. 2

37-46 mos.4
24-30 mos.

9

57--71 nios.-

87-io8 mos.
mos.

o-6 mos.
6-12 mos. 1
6

27-33 nos.3
04
27-33 mos
4
33-41 mos-f
49

78-97 mos
3
78-97 mos.'
1i2-151 mo-s.
i5i-i88 mos.'z

30-37 mos.
57-71 mos.

87-1o8 mos.

f"'-i88miE

Jan.

Nov. 2001

L7.

-

I

27

(plus 5levels)

2003

o-6 mos.
-14 M0,33
7
30-37 mos
30-37 ios.4
45
37-46 nos,0
1
0s
108-135 m1,
4
87-108 ms,'
5
210-262 mos.
'
262-327 1os.11
LI2FE5
(plUS I levels)

Figure C: Guideline Range of
Representative Defendants under Model
69
Sentencing Guidelines
Defendant
Def A
Def. B
Def. C

Factors

I

Base Offense Level (BOL) = i
BOL = I;loss = 1
BOL = i;loss = I;
abuse of trust = i

12-24

BOL = i; loss = 2;
more than 25 victims = I

24-6o

2

3

Def. D

4

Def. E

4

Def. F

Def. H

7

Def. 1

6

Def. J

24-6o

BOL = i; loss = 3;

6
5

o-6
6-12

BOL = i; loss = 2;
abuse of trust = i
more than 25 victims = I; aggravating role

Def. G

Sentencing Range (mos.)

Offense Level

-

96-132

170

BOL = i;loss = 3;
more than 25 victims = I
BOL = 1;loss = 4;
solv = i; president publicly traded corporation = 1
BOL = i; loss = 4;
CEO publicly traded corporation = i

6o-96
132-i8o
96-132

BOL = 1; loss = 7;
CEO publicly traded corporation = I;

240-300

endanger solvency large organization = i
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Term 'Loss' in U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1," April 16, 1996
(on file with author); U.S. Sentencing Commission October
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SENT. REP. 157 (1997) (testimony of Professor Frank 0. Bowman, Ill); Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Coping With "Loss": A
Re-examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes under
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Proposal for a Consolidated Theft/Fraud Guideline, with Commentary, 10 FED. SENT. REP.173 (1997) (containing the text of
the proposed consolidated theft/fraud guideline); United
States Sentencing Commission Hearing, March 5, 1998,
Prepared Statement of Frank Bowman (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/agendas/hrg3-98.htm) (containing a
detailed critique of the February 1998 staff draft loss definition); Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Briefing Paper on Problems in
Redefining "Loss," 13 FED.
SENT. REP. 22 (2000) (briefing
paper on problems of "loss" definition provided to small
group discussion leaders prior to October 2000 Economic
Crime Symposium at George Mason University); Transcript,
Plenary Session IV: "Loss" as a Measure of Offense Seriousness
and Offender Culpability, 13 FED. SENT. REP. 31 (2000) (transcript of the plenary session of the Economic Crime
Symposium at which the small group leaders summarized
the results of their discussions on redefining "loss"). Frank
0. Bowman, Ill, A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition of the "Loss" Concept in Economic
Crime Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.451 (2000); Frank 0.
Bowman, Ill, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing
Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV.5
(2001).
See Penalties for White Collar Crime Offenses: Are We Really
Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing on Penalties for White Collar
Crime Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Crime and Drugs, 107th Cong. 17-41 (2002), 15 FED. SENT.
REP. 234 (2003), also available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=280&witid=647 (testimony of Frank 0.
Bowman, Ill); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n: Hearing on Amendments in Response to Sarbanes-Oxley, Mar. 25, 2003, 107th
Cong., 15 FED. SENT. REP. 291 (2003), also available at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/3-25-03/Bowman-test.pdf
(testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, Ill); and Frank 0. Bowman,
Ill, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments
That Followed, 1 OHIo ST. J.CRIM. LAW 373 (2004) (hereinafter
"Pour Encourager les Autres").
See Bowman, Coping with "Loss," supra note 1, at 475-83
(describing the history of economic crime sentencing generally and the particular challenges of designing a sentencing
scheme for federal economic offenses).
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1) (loss table) (2005).
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (b)(9) (mass marketing and
sophisticated means enhancements) (2005).
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)-(C) (enhancements for multiple victims) (2005).
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(13)(A) (enhancement for $1 million gross
receipts from a financial institution) (2005).
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11

12

13

14

15
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U.S.S.G. §2B11.(b)(13)(B) (enhancement for jeopardizing
safety or solvency of financial institutions or large corporations) (2005).
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(15)(A)(i) (enhancement for being officer
or director of publicly traded company) (2005).
For a discussion of the "25 percent rule" and its effects on
guidelines architecture, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond
Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing
after Booker, 2005 UNIV. OFCHI. LEG.FORUM 149, 195, 199201.
An increase in offense level from 6 to 7 has no effect on a
first-time offender's sentencing range, which remains at 0-6
months. U.S.S.G. §5A (Sentencing Table) (2005).
An increase in offense level from 41 to 42 changes the sentencing range for a first-time offender from 324-405 months
to 360 months-life imprisonment. U.S.S.G. §5A (Sentencing
Table) (2005).
This result assumes a fraud conviction with a Base Offense
Level of 7, U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a) (2005); an increase of 30 levels for a loss exceeding $400 million, §2B1.1(b)(1)(N); an
increase of 4 levels for more than 250 victims,
§2B1. 1(b)(2)(B); an increase of 2 levels for sophisticated
means, §2B1.1(b)(8); an increase of 2 levels for in excess of
$1 million in gross receipts, §2B1.1(b)(12)(A); an increase of
4 levels for the offense involving a securities law violation and
being the CEO of the company, §2B1.1(b)(15)(A); an increase
of 4 levels for aggravating role, §3B1.1(a); and a possible
increase of 2 levels for obstruction of justice based on testimony during the trial, §3C1.1.
This calculation assumes a base offense level of 20, U.S.S.G.
§2B3. 1(a); an increase of 2 levels for robbery of a financial
institution, §2B3.1(b)(1); the maximum permissible increase
of 11 levels for use of a weapon and injury to a victim,
§2B3. 1(b)(2), (3); an increase of 4 levels for abducting a person to facilitate commission of the offense or escape
therefrom, §2B3.1(b)(4); and an increase of 7 levels for loss
exceeding $5 million, §2B3.1(b)(7)(H).
The offense level for one count of first-degree murder is 43,
U.S.S.G. §2A1.1 (2005). Under the Guidelines' multi-count
rules, the additional forty-nine murders could add only five
additional offense levels. U.S.S.G. §3D1.4 (2005).
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2005 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 256 tbl. 14 (2006) (hereinafter "2005
Sourcebook").

17

Id. at 257.

18

Id. at 256 (reporting that the mean sentence for defendants

convicted of murder in the portion of FY 2005 after the decision in United States v. Booker was 220 months).
19 Id. at 257 (reporting that the average sentence for a convicted murderer who was also a Criminal History Category VI
career offender was 297.5 months).
20 This result assumes a fraud conviction with a Base Offense
Level of 7, U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(a) (2005); an increase of 18 levels for a loss exceeding $2.5 million, §2B1.1(b)(1)(N); an
increase of 4 levels for more than 250 victims,
§2B1.1(b)(2)(B); an increase of 2 levels for sophisticated
means, §2B1.1(b)(8); an increase of 2 levels for in excess of
$1 million in gross receipts, §2B1.1(b)(12)(A); an increase of
4 levels for the offense involving a securities law violation and
being an officer of the company, §2B1.1(b)(15)(A); an
increase of 4 levels for aggravating role, §3B1.1(a); and a
possible increase of 2 levels for obstruction of justice based
on testimony during the trial, §3C1.1, for a total offense level
of 43, or life imprisonment.
21 I use the word "purport" advisedly, because there is good reason to doubt that even federal prosecutors are very often
prepared to enforce the white-collar sentencing rules as writ-
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ten. Note, for example, that none of the defendants in the highprofile post-Enron cases has so far received a life sentence and
that many, perhaps most, of the non-CEO defendants in these
cases have been the beneficiaries of plea agreements that
employ charge bargaining to cap their sentences and thus
avoid the full force of the sentencing guidelines.
For example, in FY 2003, only eight defendants were sentenced in cases involving an adjustment for a loss exceeding
$20 million. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Use of Guidelines and
Specific Offense Characteristics, Fiscal Year 2003, 6-7 (available at https://www.ussc.gov/GAF/03-gluse.pdf). This
number will, of course, fluctuate from year to year, but it
seems highly improbable that the total population of cases
with losses this large would ever be more than a few dozen
annually.
Frank 0. Bowman, Il, Editor's Observations; 'Tis a Gift to Be
Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
18 FED.SENT. REP. 310 (2006).
See Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres, supra note 2, at 42731.
U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 app. note 4(C) (2005) (equating theft of
undelivered mail from an authorized mail receptacle to victimization of at least fifty victims, with a concomitant offense
level increase of four or more offense levels pursuant to
§2B1.1(b)(2)).
For a recitation of sentences imposed in these and other
recent high-profile white-collar cases, see Sentencing Memorandum of Jamie Ois, United States v. Ois, Case No.
H-03-CR-217 (S.D. Tex.), at 21-22 (available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
Sentencing81806.pdf).
Figure B assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History Category I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be slightly lower. Sentences for defendants with criminal records would be slightly (in some cases
considerably) higher.
Offense Level 6. Assumes no "more than minimal planning"
(MMP).
Offense Level 6. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 8. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 9. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 10. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 11. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of four levels for loss greater than
$10,000.
Offense Level 13. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, two-level
abuse of trust.
Offense Level 14. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP two-level
abuse of trust.
Offense Level 18. Assumes Base Offense Level of 6, increase
of six levels for loss greater than $30,000, four-level increase
for undelivered U.S. mail (U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 app. note 3(B)
(2001)), two-level increase for abuse of trust.
Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of six levels for loss greater than $30,000,
four-level increase for undelivered U.S. mail (U.S.S.G. §2B1.1
app. note 4(C)(i) (2003)), two-level increase for abuse of
trust.
Offense Level 12. Assumes MMR
Offense Level 13. Assumes MMR
Offense Level 18. Assumes fraud conviction, four-level > 50
victims, and two-level sophisticated means.
Offense Level 19. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), four-level > 50 victims, and two-level sophisticated
means.
Offense Level 16. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.

Offense Level 20. Assumes fraud conviction, two-level sophisticated means, two-level abuse of trust.
45 Offense Level 21. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
44

46

Level 7), two-level sophisticated means, two-level abuse of
trust.
Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,

two-level vulnerable victim.
Offense Level 22. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim.
48 Offense Level 24. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim, two-level mass marketing.
49 Offense Level 28. Assumes four-level > 50 victims, four-level
aggravating role, two-level vulnerable victim.
50 Offense Level 31. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), six-level increase for more than 250 victims, fourlevel aggravating role, two-level vulnerable victim.
51 Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP two-level use of special
skill.
52 Offense Level 19. Assumes MMP, two-level use of special
skill.
53 Offense Level 26. Assumes two-level sophisticated means, twolevel access device/means of identification, two-level increase
for more than ten victims, two-level use of special skill.
54 Offense Level 29. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of fourteen levels for loss greater than
• $400,000, two-level sophisticated means, two-level access
device/means of identification, two-level > 10 victims, twolevel use of special skill.
55 Offense Level 18. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
56 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP two-level abuse of trust.
57 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMPR two-level abuse of trust,
four-level endanger financial institution.
58 Offense Level 32. Assumes two-level >10 victims, two-level
sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize financial institution, two-level abuse of trust.
59 Offense Level 37. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of sixteen levels for loss, two-level increase
for more than ten victims, two-level sophisticated means,
four-level jeopardize financial institution, four-level officer of
publicly traded corporation, two-level abuse of trust.
60 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
61 Offense Level 29. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
62 Offense Level 34. Assumes two-level sophisticated means,
four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
63 Offense Level 39. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of twenty levels for loss, two-level sophisticated means, four-level violation of securities law by officer of
publicly traded corporation, four-level aggravating role, twolevel abuse of trust.
64 Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
65 Offense Level 32. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
66 Offense Level 34. Assumes MMP, two-level sophisticated
means, four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
67 Offense Level 48. Assumes four-level > 50 victims, two-level
sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), fourlevel aggravating
role, two-level abuse of trust.
68 Offense Level 59. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense
Level 7), increase of thirty levels for loss, six-level > 250 victims, two-level sophisticated means, four-level jeopardize
soundness of financial institution (pension fund), four-level
violation of securities law by officer of publicly traded corporation, four-level aggravating role, two-level abuse of trust.
47
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arguably vulnerable senior citizens. This omission does
not necessarily reflect a considered policy choice. Rather,
the model guidelines proposed in this Issue contain no victim adjustments. If an offense level enhancement for
vulnerable victims were to be adopted, it might apply to
this case.

Figure C assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History
Category I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be lower. Sentences for defendants
with criminal records would be higher.
Note that the offense level for Defendant F does not
include an increase for the fact that the victims were
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